Landlord Can Evict Pet Boarding Business for Providing Grooming Services

What Happened: In 2019, a tenant signed a six-and-a-half-year lease on property to be used solely “for the purpose of operating a pet and cat boarding facility” and banning other uses without the landlord’s prior written consent. In operating the business, the tenant occasionally performed bathing and nail-trimming services for boarded dogs. It also began offering day care for dogs in 2020 during the COVID-19 pandemic. In 2021, one of the tenant’s employees purchased the company and took over the business. It was only after the purchase closed that the new owner learned that boarding was the only permissible use under the lease. The landlord demanded that she stop advertising and providing grooming and dog day care services. The new owner refused and even began grooming non-boarded animals. So, the landlord sued to evict.

Ruling: The Wisconsin court upheld the lower court’s decision to grant the landlord judgment without a trial.

Reasoning: The lease was “very clear” that the premises could be used only as “a pet and cat boarding facility.” Dictionaries, including Merriam-Webster, define “boarding” as providing regular meals and lodging in return for payment. While day care might arguably constitute “boarding,” grooming clearly did not, especially when those services were provided to animals who weren’t boarded. The fact that the landlord let the original tenant provide day care and grooming services was evidence that the parties intended for “boarding” to have a broader meaning, the tenant claimed. But the court rejected the argument because it relies on “extrinsic evidence,” in other words, the conduct of the landlord and original tenant after they signed the lease, rather than the language of the lease itself. Nor did the landlord waive its right to hold the tenant to the permitted use because the lease contained language providing that “waiver by a party of any breach of any [lease] term. . . shall not be deemed to be a waiver” of the right to enforce any “subsequent breach of that term.”

• 1050 Lillian St., LLC v. Greenlock, LLC, 2024 Wisc. App. LEXIS 156, 2024 WL 722404